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PEASANTS, CAPITALISTS AND THE STATE: 
MEX ICO'S CHANGING AGRICULTURAL 
POLICIES AND THE "HUNGARIAN PROJECT" 
Introduction 
In the twentieth century a distinctive relationship has 
existed between the Mexican state and the country's peasantry. 
Since the ejido was established as a l egal person in the 
Mexican constitution of 1917, the state has taken the respon-
sibility for directing the fortunes of those peasants who 
obtained usufruct rights over land in the agrarian reform 
which followed the Mexican Revolution. The policies which 
the Mexican state has pursued for the ejido~ have suffered 
severe problems, including peasant resistancA, bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and corruption, entrepreneurial speculation, 
private landowners' interference and international market 
fluctuations, among others. During most of the twentieth 
century, however, Mexicans managed to feed themselves and to 
produce a surplus for export to other countries, primarily 
the United States. 
In recent decades, the cumulative legacy of these 
agrarian problems has become critical. Consecutive poor 
harvests, combined with massive importations of food from 
the United States , have placed Mexico's agricultural poli-
cies in a new light. With the onset of the petroleum era 
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in the mid-1970s, public awareness of the agrarian crisis 
has increased dramatically. Because the United States is 
both Mexico's primary market for petroleum exports and the 
source for the foodstuffs which replace sagging domestic 
production, Mexicans came to realize that they were trading 
a non-renewable patrimony, petroleum, for food which they 
historically have produced for themselves. The image of 
a direct exchange of Mexican oil for American grain became a 
national nightmare. 
It is in this context that Mexican President Jos~ L6pez 
Portillo introduced, first, the Si~i~ma Agim~nia~io ~~xicano, 
or the Mexican Food System, commonly known as SAM, and later 
the L~y d~ Tom~nio Ag~op~cua~io, or the Law of Agricultural 
Development (LFA). Both SAM and the LFA were subjected to 
intense debate regarding the direction which these policies 
implied for Mexico's food self-sufficiency. Outside of 
Mexico, these policies were observed with considerable in-
terest, not only by countries like the United States which 
sell foodstuffs to Mexico, but also by other Third World 
countries which looked to oil-rich Mexico for leadership. 
SAM and the LFA were installed during the time I spent 
in Mexico in 1980 and 1981. I followed the national debate 
in the media and in conversation and I became involved in an 
evaluation of a specific project in the State of Jalisco 
which fell under the aegis of these two policies. This 
research paper concerns the first phase of my research on 
what has come to be known as the "Hungarian Project". My 
analysis necessarily is preliminary, for various reasons. 
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First, the fate of the new policies is not certain, because 
President Lopez Portillo will leave office soon and the in-
coming president will have wide latitude in establishing his 
own agricultural policies . Second, these policies were de-
signed to have long-term effects but have been in operation 
a relatively short time. Finally, the local program which I 
will describe was set up for the five year period from 1980 
to 1985, but the results of the second annual cycle are not 
yet available. However, the situations I will describe have 
implications which go beyond the immediate question of the 
success or failure of the policies and program, and in this 
sense it is worthwhile to consider them in this early phase 
of their evolution. 
SAM and the LFA 
It is not my intention to discuss SAM and the LFA in 
terms of policymaking or "statecraft", as if one could iso-
late the state from its societal and international contexts. 
Rather I intend to discuss SAM and the LFA as aspects of 
social relations in Mexico. I will describe them as poli-
cies in the briefest of terms and then go on to analyze 
them in the context of Mexican social relations. 
The designation of the Mexican Food System by the acro-
nym of SAM certainly indicates the international significance 
of the policy in an era in which "Food Power" and United 
States hegemony are virtually synonymous. It also indicates 
a wry sense of humor : the cartoonist German Malvido, 
( INGENUO 
Por German MAlVIDO 
Illustration 1: In genuo 
( I ngenuDus) , by Germ~n 
Malvi do , [l Occidental, 
September 17, 1 980 . 
In f raestructura 
Illustration 2 : Int~ae~t~uc­
tu~a (Infrastructure), by 
V ~ L' ~ azquez lra, unoma~uno, 
December 29 , 1980. 
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drawing for the Guadalajara newspaper cf Occideniaf, depicted 
a Mexican peasant shouting, "Long live SAM!" and a startled 
Uncle Sam asking meekly, "Who , me?" (see Illustration 1). 
SAM represents an attempt to establish a national food system, 
in order to assure food self-sufficiency in the 1980s, through 
massive but coordinated infusions of state capital and tech-
nical assistance. In contrast to earlier master plans for 
agriculture, SAM employs the perspective of systems theory,2 
although with a definite technical rather than social orien-
tation. It is as if, to cite one of Vazquez Lira's cartoons 
in the Mexico City daily unoma~uno, the Mexican state thought 
that it could plant pe~o~ rather than seed in the countryside 
and reap increased corn yields (see Illustration 2). 
Not all of the components of the Mexican Food System were 
immediately disclosed, leading some to call SAM an idea with-
out substance, as in Oswaldo Sagastegui's cartoon in cxcef~io~, 
in which an impoverished peasant stands in front of a picture 
labeled SAM and sees nothing but his own reflection. A tag 
hangs to one side saying, "For now we can only offer you 
this." Sagastegui titled the cartoon "Know Yourself" (see 
Illustration 3). More sarcastically, unoma~uno's Alan 
represented SAM as a wanted poster, advising the reader that 
if he sees it, to take advantage of it (see Illustration 4). 
The principal components of SAM are, first, an increase 
in the production of staples, especially maize, beans, and 
wheat, with subsidies, price supports and crop insurance, in 
order to "share the risk" between the state and the peasantry; 
and second, an educational program concerning nutrition, 
Conocete 
_----rOR OSWALDO SAGASTEGUI· ____ _ 
Illustration 3 : Con6c~i~ 
(Know Yourself), by Oswaldo 
Sagas t egui, cxc~g~io~, 
Sep t ember 23 , 1980. 
6 
Si 10 ve lprovecho! 
Illustration 4: Si go u£ 
ip~ou£cho! (If you see it, 
take advantage!), by Alan ,_ 
unoma~uno, December 20, 1980. 
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based upon the concept of the basic food basket, or cana~ta 
~a~ica. The most radical aspects of the pro g ram are the 
immensity of the resources dedicated to it and the fact that 
the component programs are coordinated by means of systems 
theory. 
The Agricultural Development Law or LFA, on the other 
hand, is oriented toward increasing the penetration of pri-
vate capital in the countryside, conceptualized as the 
"recapitalization" of agriculture, in response to the flight 
of capital from the rural areas to the cities or to the ex-
terior, with consequent effects upon production and employ-
ment. Perhaps the most important aspect of the LFA is the 
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creation of newly defined "production units" , in which £jido.6, 
or communal landholding units, are encouraged to associate 
with small landowners (because by definition there are no 
large landowners in Mexico) or with other £jido.6 for the pur-
pose of soliciting credit, with favored status for low-
interest loans and other state-sponsored supports. What the 
LFA in effect does is c~£at£ anoth£~ g£v£g 0/ gand t£nu~£, 
supposedly without affecting l and tenur e at the pre- existing 
level, consisting of private and social (i.£., the £jido) 
property. The immense significance of the new production 
units is that the agrarian reform of the post-revolutionary 
period is finished. From this point forward other solutions 
will be found for Mexico's rural ills. Indeed, many observers 
saw the LFA in contradiction to the revolutionary goals of 
land and liberty and even in contradiction to SAM , as two of 
Alan ' s other cartoons indicate (see Illustrations 5 and 6). 
The response of different social and econom ic interests 
in Mexico followed more or less predictable lines. The sup-
port of private enterprise for SAM would be surprising in it-
self, for SAM attempts to reorient agricultural production 
t oward staples and away from luxury export products , which 
have been the backbone of modern capitalist agriculture in 
Mexico. SAM , however , does not stand by itself, but in rela-
tion to the LFA and other state policies. As it became evi-
dent that the state was not going to grea tl y affect land 
tenure, in the sense of expropria tin g the remaining lati-
fundia, and that money could be made by all, the support of 
private enterprise was not slow in coming. Although SAM 
----- ---
. SentidQ contrario 
Illustration 5 : 
Cont~a~io (Wrong 
Alan, unoma-6uno, 
12, 1980. 
i-Camara! 
S.entido 
Way). by 
December 
Illustration 6: jCama~a! 
(Camera!), by Alan, unoma-6-
uno, October 17, 1980. 
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preceded the LFA by almost a year, the LFA was being dis-
cussed during this entire period. 
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No way exists to monitor the opinions of Mexican peasants 
as a whole toward SAM and the LFA. The principal peasant 
organizations, such as the National Peasant Federation 
(Contede~aci6n Nacionaf Campe4ina, or CNC), are effectively 
controlled by the hegemonic political party, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (Pa~iido Revofuciona~io In4iiiucionaf, or 
PRI), and cannot be said to have an autonomous voice. Indeed, 
no peasant groups had significant roles in designing either 
policy. 
The peasants with whom I spoke in Jalisco about SAM and 
the LFA for the main part claimed not to know what SAM entailed, 
which is not surprising, because few non-peasants knew what 
SAM meant, beyond the general concept. They saw it as just 
another state program, this time infused with nationalism, 
as suggested in Malvido's cartoon. The peasants responded 
most directly to the provision of SAM that rewards the pro-
duction of basic grains. They knew the LFA somewhat better, 
because the state presented seminars in the ejido4 to explain 
what this new law meant, especially the production units. 
The purpose of these seminars was not to elicit the opinions 
of peasants toward the LFA, but to present this ready-made 
law to them. 
The Mexican middle classes, who are increasingly removed 
from the issues of food production, responded to both SAM 
and the LFA with nationalistic zeal. A typical response is 
that of a young man who responded with horror when his sister 
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expressed skepticism at home about SAM . "What? " he said. 
"Are you in favor of the privatization (i.e., the expansion 
of private property) in the countryside?" As this comment 
indicates, it is easy to confuse the ostensive goal of SAM 
with its effects. 
The political left was cautiously hopeful about SAM , 
except for some who dismissed it altogether, as some of them 
had been involved in the studies which led to its formula-
tion. Their response to the LFA, however, was unanimously 
negative. Another of Alan's cartoons in unoma~uno shows a 
modern cattleman reaching for his holster, where he has a 
copy of the Agricultural Development Law instead of a gun. 
In his belt he carries a copy of the Law of Agrarian Protec-
tion (a sort of agrarian ha~ea~ co~pu~ which allows land-
owners to assure that their properties will not be expro-
priated by the state). The rancher is saying, "At these 
[expletive deleted] Indians, one must toss the printed word!" 
(see Illustration 7). 
What must be remembered in" attempting to understand 
these policies in their social and historical context is that 
all social issues or questions have been subordinated to 
technical ones, as Warman has suggested in terms of a tran-
sition from an agrarian policy, or pol~t;ca ag~a~ia, to an 
agricultural policy, or pol[tica ag~~cola.3 This transition 
in turn must be seen in terms of Mexico's evolving domestic 
and international situation. There is no question that the 
crisis that led to the introduction of SAM and the LFA was 
the deterioration of food self-sufficiency i n the 1970s and 
Ganadero moderno 
Illustration 7: 9anadeno 
~odenno (Modern Cattleman), 
by Alan, unoma~uno, December 
1,1980 . 
. Epidemia · 
Illustration 8: cpidemia 
(Epidemic), by Alan, uno-
ma~uno, September 19, 1980. 
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the necessity on the part of the Mexican state to pay for 
imported food with petroleum. Both types of transaction 
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were carried on primarily with the United States. The 
specter of Mexico squandering its national wealth and ending 
up in the same relative condition 40 years from now hastened 
the introduction of the SAM concept before it was fully 
elaborated. One of Alan's more poignant cartoons shows 
American grains dressed as tourists showing up at a Pemex 
(Pet~6teo~ ~exicano~) dispensary and asking politely whether 
this is the place where petroleum is exchanged for grains 
(see Illustration 8) . SAM was introduced on the eighteenth 
of March , 1980, the anniversary of the expropriation of the 
Mexican petroleum industry by then-Pr es ident Cardenas, which 
is celebrated as a holiday in Mexico. At the same time, 
President Lopez Portillo announced that Mexico would not join 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and that 
the country's daily production of crude oil would be limited, 
thus controlling its sale to foreign countries, particularly 
the United States. 4 
At first and taken by itself, SAM seemed to suggest that 
Mexico would take a nationalist path of development, turnin g 
away from foreign capital, primarily North American, as the 
motor of development. SAM, the LFA and other state policies 
emphasize that production must occur, in whatever units can 
get the job done. Even if noncapitalist production relations 
in the ejido~ produce a large share of the country's staples, 
the industrial and marketing complexes that use these pro-
ducts remain in hands, whether private or state, that are 
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committed to a more modern, capitalistic Mexico, in which 
the state and private enterprise together direct the 
econ omy 's course. Those who stand to lose the most are the 
intermediaries who have fed parasitically from the labor of 
Mexican peasants. Again, Alan gives us a cartoon on this 
subject, showing SAM digging a grave for the intermediaries 
and the intermediaries digging a grave for SAM (see Illus-
tration 9). 
A final comment reinforces the interpretation of SAM 
and the LFA presented in this report. Early in 1981, Presi-
dent Lopez Portillo opened a public debate concerning t he 
role of private property in Mexico. In his opening sally, 
he suggested that Mexicans reevaluate the "social function" 
of private property. He seemed to suggest that Mexico could 
do away with private property, if the people so desired. As 
this multi-sided debate developed, it quickly became apparent 
that private property was not the issue at stake. The true 
concern of the debate was social property, that is, the 
ejido. In the technocratic rhetoric of the Pa~tido Revogu-
ciona~io In~titucionag, the debate seemed to signify that 
Mexico could no longer afford the foolish luxury of the 
ejido. It is significant that peasant and ejido leaders 
were not consulted in the planning of either SAM or the LFA, 
that none of these leaders attended the state party cele-
brating the first anniversary of SAM, and that at the First 
National Congress on Maize, held in Guadalajara, no peasant 
or ejido representatives participated in the panels, which 
were wholly technical in orientation. 
Illustration 9: S£pu~t£~o~ (Grave-
diggers), by Alan, unoma~uno, January 
26, 1981. 
The "Hungarian Project" 
Most of what has been written about SAM and the LFA 
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concerns the policy implications of President Lopez Portillo's 
initiatives, especially regarding relations with the United 
States. Relatively little has been written about specific 
projects in which SAM and the LFA had some impact upon the 
peasants who produce Mexico's food. My intention in this 
section is to provide a preliminary analysis of the first 
phase of one such project, known locally as the "Hungarian 
Project" in the State of Jalisco. 
It may be worth noting that Jalisco, as part of the 
Mexican West, presents certain specific conditions which are 
unlike those of central, southern and northern Mexico, where 
most research on agrarian life has been conducted. What is 
now Jalisco did not have dense populations of indi genous 
groups at the time of the Spanish Conquest, and no pre-
Columbian empire existed. The Indian groups found there 
16 
were largely exterminated, except in the area around Lake 
Chapala and in the northern part of the state. Consequently, 
ethnic r~lations have evolved along a somewhat different 
trajectory than in other areas of Mexico. The Indians did 
not become subjected to harsh conditions of coerced labor on 
haciendas, at least not to the same extent as in other re-
gions. Most of contemporary Jalisco belonged not to Nueva 
Espana but to Nueva Galicia, and what is true of the former 
is not necessarily true of the latter, in both historical and 
contemporary times. The lack of a suitable labor force im-
peded the development of latifundia and the haciendas of the 
region specialized in raising livestock in addition to 
staples. Small-scale private property still is quite preva-
lent in Jalisco, especially in the area known as Los Altos de 
Jalisco, a primary locus of the Cristero Rebellion of the 
1920s and 1930s. 5 Jalisco was not a hotbed of the Mexican 
Revolution, nor were the pressures for agrarian reform as 
strong there as in other regions. In many ways, the state 
is quite conservative and it has been called the most Catho-
lic of the Mexican states. 
The "Hungarian Project" was designed for the Union of 
[jI-do/; "Francisco 1. Madero" in the municipali ty of Jocotepec, 
which lies immediately to the west of Lake Chapala. The 
union was formed several years ago, during the administration 
of former President Luis Echeverria, who supported the 
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development of associati ons of independent ~j ido~. 6 Thi s 
union cons i sts of four ~jido~ : Zapotitan de Hidalgo , 
Hue j otitan , EI Mo lin o and San Marcos . 7 The first three ~j id o~ 
were formed from the f ormer haciendas of Huejotitan and 
Zapotitan , whi ch earlie r constituted a s i ng l e hacienda , 
Huejotitan, that occupied the entir e valley. Thi s hacienda 
was divided by inheritance into the two haciendas of Huejo -
titan and Zapotitan. 8 During the agrarian reform, t hese 
haciendas were divided into thr ee ~jido~, tw o of which carry 
the names of the old haciendas, a lthough the boundari es of 
t he hac i endas were not stri ctly observed in demarcating the 
new ~jido~ . EI Mo lino i s that part of the ol d Hac i enda de 
Hu e j ot i tan where wheat was milled before be i ng shi pped to 
Guadalajara. 
Any anthropo l ogist could have predi cted that a union 
which brought together the two ~jido ~ of Huejotitan and Zapo -
titan would encoun t er great difficulties, as these two ~j id o~ 
have sustained competition and hos tiliti es from before the 
tim e they were constituted as ~j ido~, perhaps dating to th e 
time the Haci enda de Huejotitan was divided. In fact, one 
could hardly ask for a more suitabl e case for cont r oll ed com -
pari son . Zapoti tan i s a well- organiz ed ~j id o , wi t h effect i ve 
l eadership , that has managed t o introduce substan ti a l i mprove -
ments i n the community without depending upon, as they say , 
papa gogi~~no. Among these i mprovement s are potabl e water , 
electricity, a community p l aza , a bridge , a paved yard and , 
most impor t antl y , a building for ~jido offices and meetings , 
known as the ca~a ~jidag. The community has both primary and 
secondary schools and also a small clinic operated by the 
Ministry of Health. 
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In contrast, nearby Huejotitan achieved some of these 
improvements only after Zapotitan had done so, and then only 
with governmental help, not on the basis of their own efforts. 
In Huejotitan, ejido meetings are held in the local primary 
school, as they have no ca~a ejidaf. The youth of Huejotitan 
who want to attend school beyond the primary level must go 
to the school in Zapotitan or must leave the area to live 
with relatives or friends in places like Guadalajara. As a 
consequence, there are only a very few students from Huejotitan 
in the secondary school in Zapotitan. With regard to medical 
care, the only local option to the clinic in Zapotitan is a 
larger facility in the town of Jocotepec. 
These two communities differ decisively in l~adership, 
which reflects the competing interests in the respective com-
munities. [jidata~io~ with cattle and other livestock are 
more powerful in Huejotitan than in Zapotitan and because 
they want to maintain the extensive exploitation of ejido 
lands, they can be counted on to oppose any project that would 
change the existing patterns of exploitation. There are 
ejidata~io~ with livestock in Zapotitan, but they appear less 
able to prevail in community decisions. One important fac-
tion in Zapotitan consists of non-ejidata~io~ who nonetheless 
attend the monthly ejido meetings and push for their particu-
lar interests. Zapotitan also appears to be better organized 
with regard to the outside world, as they have strong con-
tacts in various cities on this side of the border, to whom 
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they refer as "our people." 
The ejido leader, or comi~a~io ejidae, in Huejotitan 
during the period of this initial study was a man whom I will 
call Felipe Estevez, a charismatic and mysterious man who 
appears to hold sway in Huejotitan through fear. Felipe is 
articulate and impressive and he manages the ejido meetings 
with considerable skill. He is equally adept at expressing 
a critical evaluation of the government's manipulation of 
his community as he is at "playing peasant" and denying any 
knowledge of the vertical links within Mexican society. 
The effective leader in Zapotitan was Juan Arroyo (also 
a pseudonym), who held the two important positions of comi-
~a~io ejidae and p~e~idenie of the union of ejido~. Early 
in 1981, Juan relinquished the former role. He is less 
charismatic than Felipe and exercises his influence more sub-
tly. Rather than directing his ejido's monthly meetings, 
Juan avoids intervention until it is unavoidable and then he 
does it with underspoken skill. 
This is the context which existed in Jocotepec at the 
time of the introduction of the "Hungarian Project." The 
Mexican government signed an agreement for scientific and 
technical cooperation with the Hungarian government in late 
1 977. This agreement included a "Special Agreement for Cooper-
ation in the Area of Agriculture and Forestry," under which 
this project falls. Since Hungary is one of Europe's leading 
corn producers, for which they have developed considerable 
expertise, it was logical that Hungary attempt to share its 
knowledge with Mexico, which also is an important producer of 
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corn, but with much less expertise. The Hungarian goverment 
assigned the task of educating Mexican peasants in advanced 
techniques of corn cultivation to the consulting firm of 
AGROBER. 
The agronomists of AGROBER designed a five-year project. 
In the first phase, correspoding to the 1980-81 agricultural 
cycle, they would increase the production of corn by applying 
the techniques which they had perfected in Hungary, with adap-
tations for the conditions of this area. To do this, they 
prepared the soil to a greater extent than the Mexican pea-
sants had done: they plowed twice at 30 centimeters and 
applied various types and quantities of fertilizers. They 
planted four types of improved seeds at a density of 48,000 
plants per hectare, an increase of about 25 percent. They 
used the pesticide Furadan and seven types of herbicides, 
some applied by airplane. The machinery they used was sophis-
ticated and expensive. In addition to increased corn output, 
the first phase contemplated the collection and sale of 
bundled corn stalks as forage (paca~). 
The second phase was to build upon the first by using 
the paca~ to feed the increased livestock population of the 
Qjidata~io~. This phase was to include intensive livestock 
raising in feedlots. In subsequent phases, the union was to 
become transformed into an autonomous agroindustry, incor-
porating corn cultivation, livestock raising and meat pro-
cessing in the same locale, providing more skilled employment 
and greater remuneration for union members. At the same time, 
this development would impede outmigration from the area to 
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Guadalajara, Mexico City and the United States. 
Originally , the project was to encompass all four ejldo~ 
of the union, but due to a last minute decision in the Mexican 
Ministry of Agriculture, the scope of the project was limited 
to three contiguous ejldo~, Huejotit~n, Zapotit~n and El Molin6, 
and was renamed a "pilot project," involving only 1,000 of the 
union's 4,300 hectares. The ejldata~lo~ were not given any 
reason for this change. One may speculate that the risk of 
failure was too great for the Ministry of Agriculture to in-
vest its name and resources without providing an escape. 
To carry out the project, the Hungarians had to convince 
the ejldata~lo~ that the project would bear results, for it 
was necessary for them, to remove their fences and "compact" 
individual plots of four hectares each into an extension of 
land which would make the use of large machinery economically 
feasible. The person who carried most of the responsibility 
for informing the individual ejldata~lo~ about what the pro -
ject involved and enlisting their support was a social worker 
from the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture who was assigned to 
the union. Armed with plans and projections, specifically 
mentioning 15-16,000 pe~o~ per hectare as the anticipated 
yield, she succeeded in convincing a sufficient number of 
ejldata~lo~ to participate and the preparation of the lands 
for cultivation began. 
An immediate problem was created by the non-participation 
of the ejldata~lo~ of El Molino, who waited until the expen-
sive process of preparing the land for cultivation was com-
plete, at which point they planted sorghum and in effect 
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dropped out of the project. Thus the Hungarians continued 
with only two ejido~, the old enemies of Huejotitan and Zapo-
titan. 
There were other setbacks in the first part of 1980 which 
cannot be dealt with at length here. The government changed 
the personnel in positions of direct contact with the ejida-
ia~io~ on several occasions and created a legacy of discon-
tinuity. Some of these changes were positive, as in the case 
of the first organizers who spent six months in Jocotepec 
without doing any organizing. But other personnel changes 
were disastrous, as in the case of a new representative of 
the Ministry of Agriculture who, at a meeting in which the 
assembled ejido members of Zapoti tan wanted to know the net 
result of the harvest, set out to lecture them on the benefits 
of the Agricultural Development Law (LFA). The meeting al-
most ended in violence and with it the Hungarian Project in 
that ejido. 
Moreover, the Mexican government failed to deliver the 
promised works of infrastructure, especially the drainage 
ditches that were necessary to carry the runoff from the 
mountains during the spring rains. Without the ditches, one-
third of the approximately 1,000 hectares was flooded, re-
suIting in the loss of much of the corn. 
salvaged what they could as forage. 
The Hungarians 
A third set of problems concerning the machinery and 
seeds the union bought also decreased the yield of corn. The 
Hungarians favored John Deere tractors but a representative 
of the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture insisted on Massey-
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Ferguson trac tors, which proved defective. The seed used was 
bought from Northrup King and it turned out that this seed 
had been inadver tently cross-fertilized at the plant and did 
not produce as well as it should have. (A l awsuit was filed 
concerning the faulty seed because Northrup King first pro-
mised to deliver new seed for the 1981-82 cycle and then 
reneged.) 
The harvest took place in January and February of 1981, 
over a month l ater than in previous years, as the ejidata~io~ 
had to await the authorization of the Minis try of Agriculture 
to begin the harvest. The primary reason for the delay was 
the moisture conten t of the corn. Because t he corn was to be 
sold to CONASUPO , the state-run food distribution system, 
they had to wait until the corn met CONASUPO's moisture stan-
dards. Due to the delay, more of the corn was lost to fires 
of unknown and s uspicious origin. 
Another reversal occurred at this time, p l acing the en -
tire project in doubt. Even before the harvest was in, the 
Hungarian technicians received a letter from the Mexican Minis-
try of Agriculture that announced the termination of the five-
year contract at the end of the first year , citing budgetary 
constraints. Because the project was entirely consistent with 
SAM and the LFA, and because the state had just announced the 
l argest -ever budget for agriculture in Mexican history, this 
explanat i on convinced no one. It seems more likely that the 
Hungarians' success caused some people in the Min i stry of 
Agriculture to believe that t heir work was being undermined, 
and by foreigners! As a result, the project was to continue , 
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but under the direction of Mexican agronomists and technicians. 
These specialists were not familiar with the Hungarian tech-
niqu es to be employed in subsequent phases of the project and 
it was feared that the five-year agroindustrial project would 
be frozen in its first phase. The leader of the ejido of 
Huejotitan, Felipe Estevez, accused the president of the union, 
Juan Arroyo, of running off the Hungarians. 
Not until the final results of the 1980-81 cycle carne in 
did these events make sense. The most important news, which 
everyone had been waiting for, was the net income per hectare. 
Whereas the social worker, citing the figures g iven her by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, had proposed around 15,000 pe~o~ 
per hectare (about $650 per hectare at the exchange rate pre-
vailing at the time), the actual income was only half of that. 
An accounting of income and expenses shows what happened: 
Income 
Sale of corn 14,113,475.74 pe~o~ 
Sale of forage 3,246,596.10 
Other sales 3 2 824,640.62 
Total sales 21,184 ,70 8.46 pe~o~ 
E.x.pen~e~ 
Storage 2,108.09 pe~o~ 
Office equipment 23,851.80 
Tools 30,999.67 
Financial expenses 450 . 00 
Administration 273,934.03 
Operating expenses 13,714,377.27 
Other expenses 2,701.00 
Payments advanced to union 3 2 711,097.48 
Total expenses 18,528,929.90 pe~o~ 
The difference between income and expenses, added to the 
payment advanced to the ejidata~io~, amounts to 6,367,876.04 
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P~404, or about $265,000. 
Although the income was less than anticipated, the ex-
penses charged against the union were what caused the alarm 
among the ~jidaia~io4. The sale of corn is obvious, as is 
the sale of forage. The " other sales" entry partly corres-
ponds to the profits the union realized by operating as an 
agent for the state-run fertilizer company, Fertimex. Possi-
bly a million P~404 were contributed by SAM in support of 
the cultivation of staple foods. 
The ~jidaia~io4 were at a loss to explain some of the 
expenses charge d against them. The office equipment had 
been promised by the Ministry of Agriculture, so they were 
surprised to see this show up as a debit. The large entry 
for operating expenses was not further broken down, making 
it impossible to tell what is being charged the union. They 
possi bl y were charged for drainage, even tho u g h this too was a 
commitment on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture. In 
other words , the ministry washed its hands of the Hungarian 
Project and charged what it could to the ~jidaia~io4. 
No one was pleased with these figures. The leader of 
Huejotitan, Felipe Estevez , again accused the president of 
union, Juan Arroyo, of malfeasance, which forced an audit 
and delayed the announcement of the final fi gures. Arroyo 
eventually was shown to be innocent of any wrongdoing. The 
social worker was even accused of misleadin g the ~jidaia~io4 
with her optimistic projections of earnings , s upplied of 
course by her own ministry, and she concluded that her posi -
tion among them was so compromised by the turn of events tha t 
she tentatively decided to resign before the end of the 
1981-82 cycle. 
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The question that emerged was, how to proceed? Further 
cooperation with El Mo lino and especially with Huejotitan 
was virtually impossible for Zapotitan. Both Zapotitan and 
Huejotitan decided to reconstitute their respective lands as 
product i on units under the Agricultural Development Law, but 
independently of each other. For undetermined reasons, the 
Minister of Agriculture declared that i ndividual ~jido~ could 
not form production units, that only two or more ~j id o~ or 
individual ~jido~ with small property- owners could do so . 
Consequently , these ~j ido ~ could not form separate producti on 
units, although Zapotitan achieved virtually the same status 
due to its excellent credit history. At the time I left 
Mexico , it was unclear how the machinery that the union pur -
chased would be divided among the new units, but one thing 
was clear : much of the machinery used in 1 980 - 81 had been 
paid for and the ~jidata~io~ faced the 1981-82 cycle with 
greater experience and on a stronger financial footing than 
they had achieved in previous cycles. 
It is interesting to note that in both ~jido~ the widows 
of ~jidata~ io ~ pressured their leaders most effect i vely to 
continue the project . Despite the disappointments of 1980-
81, these women did better financially in participati ng in 
the project and realizing six to seven thousand p~~o~ per 
hectare than i n renting their lands to others for perhaps 
1,500 p~~o~ per hectare. 
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Implications 
I do not wish to offer premature conclusions for this 
preliminary analysis. Instead I prefer to discuss the im-
plications of this analysis as it now stands. These impli-
cations fall into three categories: first, what is likely to 
happen during the next few years of the transformed Hungarian 
Project, if it is not cancel l ed altogether; second, what are 
the implications of SAM and the LFA for Mexico ' s food prob-
lems; and third, what does the analysis say about the future 
relationi between the United States and Mexico. These cate -
gories are arranged in decreasing order of certainty on my 
part. 
With regard to the future of the Hungarian Project, it 
seems likely that it will remain in the first phase of in-
creased productivity, at least until some other master plan 
is articulated, when the entire project may suffer a vain-
glorious demise. The vision of a complete agroindustry in 
the valley, providing employment and better incomes for the 
people of these communities, now seems completely implausible. 
What is most worrisome is that Mexican agronomists and tech-
nicians from the Ministry of Agriculture and other ministries 
will be directing the efforts of the ejidata~io~. They are 
unfamiliar with the Hungarian techniques and are not committed 
to them. The ones I knew in 1981 seemed to pull the ejido~ 
in different directions, representing different bureaucratic 
interests: the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
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Agrarian Reform and the Rural Bank. 
Even if the project is stillborn, . the ejido of Zapotit~~ 
will be in a relatively goo d position for the next few years. 
The ejidaia~io~ gained important experience in 1980-81, as 
they virtually carried the entire project. Even if they did 
not realize the net income which they anticipated, their 
financial situation is sound in that they can acquire literally 
all the financing they need from Banrural, the state bank for 
rural development . Even if SAM were to be terminated, and 
even under tEB LFA, which appears to have excluded them, 
they probably will do well, at least compared to other ejido~ 
in the area. Their leadership is better suited to the typ es 
of rural development programs which the technocratic Mexican 
state is likely to propose in the 1980s. And since the land 
that is most subject to flooding is in the ejido of Huejotit~n, 
Zapotit~n should do better on its own in 1981- 82 . 
Huejotit~n, in contrast, will probably not do well 
because they did not gain as much practical experience during 
the last cycle. Their lands are more subject to flooding. 
Strong gro up divisions exist within the ej ido. And their 
leader ship has been of a cacique-type, which may be less ef -
fective in technocratic Mexico in the 1980s. The last state-
ment presupposes relatively consistent policies in the next 
~exenio, which the designation of Miguel de la Madrid as 
President Jose Lopez Portillo's successor virtually assures. 
I would like to turn to an issue which has not been ad -
dressed directly in this essay. So far I have used the term 
"peasant" only descriptively, not analytically, to refer to 
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anyone who lives in rural Mexico. In part, I have done so 
because this is how the term is used in the state policies 
to which I have referred and by the ~jidaia~io~, who call 
themselves camp~~ino~. The issue which needs to be discussed 
is whether SAM, the LFA and the Hungarian Project represent a 
social transformation of the peasantry into something else. 
Of course, since the Mexican Revolution of this century 
and especially since the Agrarian Reform, the peasantry has 
been defined by their relationship to the state, rather than 
to landlords, especially in the Mexican West, where social 
relations during the Po~ti~iaio differed from those of cen-
tral and southern Mexico. The ~jido, it bears repeating, 
was established as a legal person in the Constitution of 1917, 
a status peasant communities never had in classic European 
feudalism. Indeed, SAM was touted as the forging of a new 
alliance between the state and the peasant, as suggested in 
the slogan, "7~aio Limpio con ~g Camp~~ino" ("Clean Treatment 
for the Peasant"). 
The identity of the ~jidaia~io~ as peasants does not seem 
a problem among the people of Zapotitan and , in many regards, 
they are now operating as a society of petty entrepreneurs. 
This identity, however, is problematical for the ~jidaia~io~ 
of Huejotitan, who expressed their resistance to the Hungarian 
Project in terms of their fear of being transformed into pro -
letarians (jo~nag~~o~) working their own lands. I do not 
interpret this fear in terms of attachment to the land or 
peasant autonomy. The issue, I believe, is gainful employment 
with security. Felipe Estevez of Huejotitan once complained 
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bitterly to me not of the lack of peasant autonomy but of 
the lack of jobs in his town. He pleaded for any kind of 
program which would bring employment to Huejotitan and he made 
disparaging remarks about ~rnigr€s who returned to this town 
from the United states for visits only to parade their 
material wealth and ridicule the poverty of those who had 
stayed behind . 
How does one account for this difference of perspective 
between the ~jidata~io~ of Huejotitan and those of Zapotitan? 
It might seem quite ordinary to suggest that leadership is 
the issue, but I believe that it is. Again , I do not mean 
leadership in the abstract sense of policymaking but in the 
concrete sense of relations of production. To take the exam -
ples of Felipe Estevez and Juan Arroyo, both are what Gramsci 
has called organic intellectuals, in the sense of persons 
arising in a particular social class who elaborate and arti -
culate a particular interpretation of their class predicament 
and propose means to deal with it. 9 They certainly are not 
traditional intellectuals who are tied to society's institu-
tions. Juan Arroyo more closely approximates the organic in-
tellectual than does Felipe Estevez, who is compromised by 
his shrouded dealings with officialdom. Juan Arroyo advocates 
careful collaboration with the state and he easily is an equal 
to the state's local representatives in maneuvering within 
established channels. His experience and understated per-
sonal style make him indispensable in his community. It is 
doubtful that any of his immediate group, with whom he grace-
fully shares power, could readily take his place. Felipe 
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Estevez is a cautious co - conspirator who , as I suggested 
earlier, rules through fear . The social worker told me that 
when one person in Huejotitan expressed to her vague opposi -
tion to Estevez in a private conversation , she encouraged him 
to speak out publicly, to which he replied that she did not 
know what things were like in Huejotitan when she was not 
around . Although no one else I knew had his charisma , there 
very probably are several persons who could take his place , 
for the state has its ways of conjuring up such individuals. 
There is no doubt that SAM , the LFA and the Hungarian 
Project are having a great impact upon the ejido~ and people 
of Jocotepec. The ultimate question is one of social trans-
formation: does the technocratic character of the contem-
porary Mexican state mean that these "peasants" wil l be pau -
perized and proletarianized , as may well happen in Huejotitan 
if the Hungarian Project fails, or will the y be transformed 
into petty, collective entrepreneurs , as appears to be 
occurring in Zapotitan? In either case , current models of 
peasantries which stress subsistence orientation are unlikely 
to be of asststance . 
The second implication I will discuss concerns the 
technical rather than the social orientation of the model of 
development that is implicit in this project and in other ac -
tiviti es sponsored by SAM and the LFA. During the twentieth 
century, many observers of Mexican society and history have 
observed that the ultimate hope for Mexico was the ejido. 
Of course , these observers have differed with regard to what 
they consider the advantag es of the ejido. Now , in the 1980s, 
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it may seem that SAM and the LFA signify that Mexico is 
turning away from the ejido to high technology solutions for 
development. In particular, the intensive use of petroleum-
based fertilizers and pesticides, not to mention large, expen -
sive machinery, might sound like precisely the wrong kind of 
development. Why not employ ecologically sound, intermediate 
technology and organic methods more in accordance with the 
existing social relations among peasants? These questions 
seem especially appropriate for Mexico, whose petroleum re-
serves are predicted to last for about 40 years. What happens 
to high-technology Mexico when the oil runs out? 
I would like to suggest that the wisdom of "little is 
better," as broadcast from wealthy, industrialized countries 
like the United States, is perceived quite differently in the 
so - called Third World. More precisely, the anti - high-tech-
nology argument sounds to people in the Third World like 
another attempt to keep them from sharing in the material 
comforts of the modern world. After all, we are telling them 
what to do again and we are not following our own advice! 
From Mexico ' s perspective, the insistence upon high-
technology solutions for the country ' s woes is entirely under-
standable, as a contradictory move in a contradictorY world. 
This logic is most easily stated in terms of the alternative 
of not following a high-technology model . The features of 
SAM and the LFA make it clear that social relations in Mexico, 
particularly in the countryside, are so potentially explosive 
that only a massive technical solution is possible . A tech-
nical solution, of course, appears not to change the pre-
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existing social balance, at least not in the short run, the 
wayan authentic agrarian reform or even an enclosure move -
ment might . So in the first place, the high-technology al -
ternative is dictated by the existing relations between social 
classes in Mexico . 
Mexican leaders understand quite wel l that the golden 
ear of oil is finite and has certain negative consequences , 
referred to as the "petrolization" or even the "Iranification " 
of the Mexican economy. As stated earlier, the current esti -
mate is that Mexico will not run out of oil for 40 years . 
Their sensitivity to this issue is reflected in the joke 
that was going around Mexico last year , to the effect that 
due to the inferior academic training of Mexican economists , 
there had been a sl i ght miscalculation of the time the oil 
reserves would last. The decimal point had been misplaced , 
such that the actual period was on l y four, not 40, years . 
The irony of this joke makes it patently clear how sensitive 
Mexicans are to the uncertainty of a future dependent upon 
oil. 
For Mexicans , the question is one of what is worse , con-
serving the oil and failing to take advantage of the historical 
moment , or using the oil now and figuring out what to do when 
the oil runs out at that time? At a time when nuclear power 
is on the wane in the United States , it i s being actively 
promoted in Mexico , as a means of slowing down the exploi -
tation of oil and offering an alternative to gas-fired elec -
trical plants when the gas is gone . In other words , their 
attitude is, let's do it now and work out the ensuing problems 
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when we have to. The only restriction placed on this kind 
of growth is to make certain that the growth does not get 
out of hand and incit e another revolution. 
As contradictory as this may sound, I do not see how we 
could expect them to do otherwise. For Mexico to adopt an 
intermediate-technology solution now, without having gone 
through a high-technology phase , is to condemn it to an 
eternal position of inferiori ty, especially . , . v~~-a-v~~ 
their powerful neighbor to the north. They will not do it. 
Finally, I will circle back to the international impli-
cations of SAM and the LFA, particularly regarding relations 
between Mexico and the United Sta t es . Oil obvious l y is the 
basis of Mexico 's newly acquired prestige and power in the 
New World . President Lopez Portillo has manipulated this 
leverage with admirable skill , using the sale of crude oil 
at below- market prices as a kind of foreign aid to its poorer 
neighbors. As a consequence, a policy like SAM is importan t 
to the entire Third World. For Mexico to re - establis h food 
self- sufficiency, at a time when organizations such as the 
Inter - American Development Bank are calling on Latin American 
countries to forget about self-suffici ency and be satisfied 
with relative food security , is a tremendous ges tur e on the 
part of the second most dynamic economy in Latin Amer i ca . 
Obviously, the Mexicans are anxious not to fail, as failure 
now means not only eating U.S. grain s but having their faces 
rubbed in the mud. Consequentl y and understandably, they are 
cautious about programs like the Hungarian Project, which 
might be interpreted as suggesting that Mexico cannot do it 
alone and must depend upon outsiders for help. SAM is 
Mexico putting it to Uncle Sam with flare and grace. The 
LFA is a less publicized tool to guarantee that result. 
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NOTES 
1. The research from which this essay derives occurred be-
tween August of 1980 and July of 1981, when the author 
enjoyed a Fulbright-Hayes grant in Mexico. I particu-
larly wish to thank Mr. Frank Lattanzi of the American 
Consulate in Guadalajara for his personal and professional 
consideration during this time. The essay was originally 
presented as a colloquium paper at the Latin American In-
stitute of the University of New Mexico. I would like to 
acknowledge Karl Schwerin's astute comments. Later, the 
essay was presented at the University of Michigan, where 
I also benefited from comments. 
2. Michael Redclift, D£v£eopm£ni poeicymaking in ~£xico: 
7h£ Si~i£ma Aeim£nia~io ~£xicano (SA~)~ Working Papers 
in U.S.-Mexican Studies, 24, Program in United States-
Mexican Studies - (La Jolla, CA: University of California, 
San Diego, 1981). 
3. Arturo Warman, "Frente a la crisis, z,politica agraria 0 
poll. ti ca agrl cola?" Com£~cio cxi.£~io~ 28: 6 (June 1978), 
pp. 681-687. 
4. Redclift, OPe cii., p. 10; John J. Bailey and John E. 
Link, Siai£c~ati and Ag~icueiu~£ in ~£xico, 1980-82: 
Dom£~iic and lo~£ign poeicy Con~id£~aiion~ in ih£ ~aking 
ot ~£xican Ag~icueiu~ae poeicy, Working Papers in U.S.-
Mexican Studies, 23, Program in United States-Mexican 
Studies (La Jolla, CA: University of California, San 
Diego, 1981). 
5. Jean Meyer, La C~i~iiada, three volumes (Mexico: Siglo 
XXI Editores, 1973-74). 
6. Helio Garcia Alfaro and Enrique Fernandez Perez, "Las 
uniones de ejidos, R£vi~ia d£e ~£xico Ag~a~io (special 
number, 1976), pp. 99-104. 
7. The £jido of San Marcos lies in the municipality of 
Zacoalco de Torres. 
8. Eric Van Young, personal communication. 
9. Eugene D. Genovese, "On Antonio Gramsci," Siudi£~ on ih£ 
L£ti 7 (1967), pp. 83-107; Jerome Karabel, "Revolutionary 
Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the Problem of In-
tellectuals," poeiiic~ and Soci£iy 6 (1976), pp. 123-172. 
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